College Admissions with Affirmative Action
- Title:
- College Admissions with Affirmative Action
- Author:
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila
- Collector:
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila
- Description:
- This paper first shows that, when colleges' preferences are substitutable, there does not exist any stable matching mechanism that makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student. It introduces student types and captures colleges' preferences towards affirmative action via type specific quotas: A college always prefers a set of students that respects its type specific quotas to another set that violates them. Then it shows that a stable mechanism that makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student exists if and only if each college's preferences satisfy responsiveness over acceptable sets of students that respect its type specific quotas. These results have direct policy implications in several entry-level labor markets (Roth 1991). Furthermore, the algorithm and the related incentive theory developed here is applied to controlled choice in the context of public school choice by Abdulkadiroglu and Sfinmez (2003).
- Date:
- 2003
- Imprint:
- Stanford (Calif.) : Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2003
- Genre:
- Conference papers and proceedings
- Notes:
- Presented at SITE on August 15, 2003